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NOTES
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF LOCAL AIRPORT
NOISE REGULATION
As the airline industry has grown, the noise level in the vicinity of airports
has become a considerable irritation, as well as a danger to the health of
persons who live and work in these areas.' Local governments have sought
to curb this noise through local regulation. The federal government has also
sought to regulate noise levels through its regulation of interstate commerce.
Which governmental unit should have authority for promulgation of airport
noise regulations has been the subject of much litigation in the past.2 The
advocates of federal control argue that the federal government has preempted the field of airport noise regulation.8

Although there is no express

1. For a thorough discussion of health dangers from excessive noise, see ENVIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION AGENcY, REPORT TO THE PRESmENT AND CONGRESS ON

NOISE, S.

Doc. No. 63, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An
Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 652, 679 (1970); Note, The Noise Control Act of 1972-Congress Acts to Fill the
Gap in Environmental Legislation, 58 MINN. L REv. 273, 277-78 (1973). The authors
note that noise can impair the ability of persons to engage in their normal activities by
interrupting concentration, reducing efficiency, creating irritability, and even producing
changes in heart rates, respiration, gastric activity, pupil size, and sweat gland activity.
They point out that a number of studies associate noise with mental disorders. See
Dempsey, Noise, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1975 § 6 (Magazine) at 31, for a discussion of
health dangers from nonaircraft excessive noise.
2. See text accompanying notes 20-34 infra.
3. These groups include the Air Line Pilot's Association, Air Transport Association,
National Organization to Insure a Sound-Controlled Environment, and the Sierra Club.
Although they do not agree as to whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or the National Aeronautic and Space
Administration (NASA) should have primary authority for supervising noise regulation,
each group has stated that considerations of safety and uniformity dictate that the federal
government should have control of this area. See Environmental Protection Agency,
Legal and Institutional Analysis of Aircraft and Airport Noise and Apportionment- of
Authority Between Federal, State, and Local Governments, Appendix B (1973); A

Muffler on Airport Noise, BUSINESS

WEEK,

Feb. 9, 1976, at 46.

The doctrinal foundation of the preemption concept is the supremacy clause. U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, § 2. Professor Engdahl has thoroughly analyzed the case law surrounding the preemption doctrine. The following discussion relies heavily on his analysis.
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statutory provision for federal preemption in this area, 4 advocates of federal
control claim that because of the pervasive nature of federal regulation, local
control has been preempted. Those who favor local control, however,
counter that in the absence of a specific statutory provision for federal
preemption, control of airport noise should remain in the hands of local
governments. 5 Proponents of this view argue that when Congress has not
specifically provided otherwise, its intention must be to retain the balance
between federal and state or local regulation struck by earlier legislation in
the area. Accordingly, because the area of noise regulation has traditionally
been one of local concern, local authority should prevail."
In 1973, the question of whether the federal government had preempted
the field of airport noise regulation reached the United States Supreme Court
See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER-FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUTSHELL 317-45

(1974). Judicial interpretation of the clause has been necessary because of the many
difficult questions that have arisen concerning federal and state regulatory provisions.
The earliest decisions recognized that when a state regulation collides with a federal
regulation, the state law is invalid. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). Some members of the Court have sought to extend Gibbons to embrace the
idea that the mere grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce is enough
in itself to invalidate any state regulation in the field. Thus federal preemption would remain whether the state regulations in question collided with federal regulations or complemented them. See, e.g., City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 158-59
(1837) (Story, J., dissenting). In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), the Court took a more permissive approach to the problem of federal preemption. When subjects of commerce admitted only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, regulatory power was considered to be exclusively federal. On the other hand,
subjects of commerce which required "that diversity [of regulation], which alone can
meet local necessities" were subject to concurrent state and federal regulation. Id. at
319.
More recent cases have upheld state regulations even when Congress not only had
been granted regulatory power but also had exercised its power in that field. E.g.,
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933). Congressional intent was deemed to be the
dominant factor in determining whether federal regulation was to be exclusive. E.g.,
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). The Court has
developed varying standards for determining when Congress intended federal regulation
to be exclusive. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (when federal
regulation is extensive, Congress is deemed to have intended exclusive federal regulation); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)
(when federal agency has limited powers, inference is that Congress had a noninclusionary intent); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (when regulation sought to impose
uniform standards, exclusionary congressional intent may be inferred).
4. There is no statutory provision in the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13011542 (1970), or the Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. III, 1973),
which explicitly provides for federal preemption. (An example of an express provision
for federal preemption is found in the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301
(1970)).
5. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 641-51
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
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in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.7 The majority found
that the field had been preempted because of the pervasiveness of federal

regulation.8 The decision applied to a unique factual setting, however, in
which a municipality which was not the proprietor of an airport attempted to
regulate noise through its police power. The Court declined to consider
"what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor."
Since the
Burbank Airport was one of probably very few privately owned airports in
the country, 10 the question of whether the field of noise regulation is
federally preempted with respect to local authorities who are also the airport
proprietors remains unanswered. While some courts have followed Burbank

in cases involving municipal airport proprietors, 1 at least one court has held
that local proprietary control is not per se preempted. 12 In addition, federal
legislation has been introduced which would provide for a sizable component
of local control in airport noise regulation.13
This article will examine judicial developments and legislative and administrative action taken since Burbank. It will describe the system of federal
noise regulation which now exists and discuss the reforms which have been
suggested to limit airport noise and to strike a working balance between federal and local control.
I.

PREEMPTION CASE LAW PRIOR TO

Burbank

Because neither the Federal Aviation Act nor the Noise Control Act of
1972 contain express preemptive authority, 14 courts have looked to congressional intent in their attempts to discern whether the federal government has
preempted the field or whether state power is undisturbed "except as the
7. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
8. Id. at 633.
9. Id. at 635-36 n.14. Other courts have found that airport proprietors retain
substantial power to regulate airport noise. In Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port
Authority, 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the Association sued to enjoin enforcement
of a takeoff fee of $25 which had been levied by the Port Authority on all flights during
peak traffic hours at New York's three major airports. The court granted summary
judgment for the Port Authority, finding that in view of airport congestion, imposition of
the fee was justified as a means of efficient utilization of airspace. "[I]t is evident," the
court stated, "that the Administrator [of the Federal Aviation Administration] has not
. . . excluded the existence of areas of proper airport regulation [by proprietors]." id.
at 104.
10. 411 U.S. at 651-52.
11. See text accompanying notes 45-54 infra.
12. Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 64-65 (N.D. Cal.
1975). See notes 89-104 & accompanying text infra.
13. H.R. 6112, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See notes 105-13 & accompanying text
Ifra.

14. See note 4 supra.
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state and federal regulations collide."' 15 ,InBurbank, the Court used the
tests set forth in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.18 Under Rice, a purpose
to preempt could be evidenced by a scheme of federal regulation which is
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it"; by an act of Congress which may "touch a
field in which . . . the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforce-

ment of state laws on the same subject"; or by a state policy which would
'17
produce a "result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."
The Burbank majority found that the scheme of regulation of airports and air
traffic came within the first test enunciated in Rice.' 8
In the years before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Burbank,
several municipalities had attempted various forms of regulation seeking to
curb excessive noise levels. Their attempts, however, were successfully
challenged on the ground that federal regulation had preempted the field. As
a result, even before Burbank, local ordinances were, for the most part,
9
invalidated in the courts.'
The setting of minimum altitudes was one of the earliest methods of
attempting to control noise. Suffering from irritating noise, the citizens of
Cedarhurst, New York passed an ordinance prohibiting flights over their
town at less than 1,000 feet. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, in Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst,20 held
the ordinance invalid even though federal regulations, like the Cedarhurst
regulation, required all flights over populated areas to occur at an altitude
over 1,000 feet. Finding that Congress had preempted the regulation of
aircraft both above and below 1,000 feet, the court pointed out that federal
regulations, unlike the Cedarhurst ordinance, did not provide that the 1,000
foot limit on overhead flight would also apply in takeoff and landing zones.
Following the lead of the Cedarhurst court, the United States District Court
21
for the District of New Jersey, in City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
struck down an ordinance adopted by a group of New Jersey cities in the
22
vicinity of Newark. The ordinance prohibited flights below 1,200 feet.
15. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231 (1947). For thorough
discussions of the development of federal case law on the issue of preemption, see
Comment, Environmental Law-Aircraft Noise Regulation-Federal Preemption, 20
N.Y.L.F. 165 (1974); Note, Federal Pre-Emption and Airport Noise Control, 8 UR3AN
L. ANN. 229 (1974).

16.
17.
18.
19.

331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
Id. at 230.
411 U.S.at 633.
See notes 20, 25, 34 & accompanying text infra.

20. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y.1955), affd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
21. 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958).

22. Id. at 756.
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The court found that the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act 28 clearly

evidenced the intent of Congress to maintain the exclusive power to regulate
and to control the field of interstate air commerce. 24
Localities have attempted to circumvent the federal preemption problem
by placing an absolute limit on noise levels. This approach, however, has
met with no more success than the others. In American Airlines v. Town of
Hempstead,25 the Second Circuit struck down a town ordinance which
prohibited excessive noise, finding that while the ordinance was not in
direct conflict with federal regulation, it had the effect of diverting flight
paths around the town and thus caused aircraft to deviate from flight
patterns established by the Federal Aviation Administration. 26 In Town of
Hempstead, the trial court had concluded that the subject matter of the
ordinance had been federally preempted because "[t]he legislation operates
in an area committed to federal care, and noise limiting rules operating as do
those of the ordinance must come from a federal source. ' 27 The appeals
court did not find it necessary to reach the question of whether the entire
field of aircraft regulation had been federally preempted because the
particular ordinance could be declared invalid as an infringement upon
28
a specific regulation.
A third method of aircraft noise regulation, the curfew system, met with
some success prior to Burbank but was rejected by the Burbank Court.
In Stagg v. Municipal Court,29 a California appellate court upheld a Santa
Monica ordinance prohibiting jet takeoffs between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.
The court held that the doctrine of federal preemption was not applicable
because the court could discern no federal or California ordinance which
conflicted with the curfew ordinance.8 0 The Stagg court validated Santa
Monica's authority to enforce its curfew because of both its ownership of the
23. 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-722 (1970).
24. 159 F.Supp. at 755.
25. 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
26. 398 F.2d at 371 n.1.
27. 272 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), af!'d, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
28. 398 F.2d at 375-76. The court relied upon the decision in Cedarhurst.
29. 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1969).

Although the curfew

ordinance has been allowed to stand, another Santa Monica ordinance which would have
made it a misdemeanor for fixed-wing turbo jets to land or take off from the city airport
has been declared invalid by the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. The court enjoined the city of Santa Monica from taking action against
Federal Aviation Administration flight controllers who were assisting jet pilots at the
airport. 29

NOISE

REo. RPTR.A-14 (1975).

30. 2 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
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airport and its police power.8 1 Though the Stagg decision was not alone in
California in holding that local regulation of air transportation had not been
federally preempted,' 2 the reasoning of these cases has definitely been that
of the minority. The Burbank decision struck down an ordinance which
contained the same curfew as the one upheld in Stagg.33 Thus, although
pre-Burbank case law was not clear on whether local control of airport noise
should be held invalid on the ground of preemption, local regulations were
4
generally struck down.'
II.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

As a preliminary matter, in any determination of whether local or federal
authorities should regulate airport noise, consideration must be given not
only. to the question of preemption, but also to the question of which
authority bears the liability for damage suffered by neighboring residents
from excessive airport noise. Equity would seem to demand that, regardless
of the constitutional and statutory considerations of the preemption issue,
either federal law must give local airport operators a way to solve their noise
problems, "or the Federal Government must be held liable for damage
actions brought against those airports."'' " Allowing local airport proprietors
to retain some power to regulate would be logical in light of the responsibilities given local airport proprietors by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Allegheny County.' 8 In Griggs, the Court held airport proprietors financially liable to nearby property owners for damage caused to their property by
noise from commercial flights when the flights were low enough to constitute
the "taking" of an air easement over the property.8 7 The airport owner, in
31. Id. at 322-23, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
32. See Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
33. BURBANK MUNICIPAL CODE § 20-32.1 (repealed 1972). The ordinance provided
for an exception for "emergency" flights. See 411 U.S. at 626 n.1.
34. See Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is There Room for Local Regulation?, 60
CORNELL L REv. 269 (1975).

35. 118 CONG. REc. 35393 (1972) (remarks of Senator Muskie on the Environmental
Noise Control Act of 1972). See also Interoffice Memorandum from Ron Naveen, Staff
Attorney, Air Quality, Noise & Radiation Division of the EPA, to Charles L. Elkins,
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Noise Control Programs, January 21, 1976 (on file
at the Catholic University Law Review).
36. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). The doctrine of liability for a taking under a theory of
inverse condemnation was first announced in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946). In that case, the federal government was held liable as a partial lessor of the
Winston-Salem Airport for having taken an aviation easement in the property the
aircraft flew over.
37. 369 U.S. at 89.
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designing the airport and constructing it, had been required to acquire some
private property, but the Court concluded that because local residents suffered
from airport noise, the airport owner had not acquired enough land. 38 The
because, in
federal government, on the other hand, was free of liability
39
planning and constructing the airport, it had "take[n] nothing."
The Griggs decision had the effect of directing local landowners with
complaints about airport noise to sue the local airport owners for a "taking"
under the fourteenth amendment or comparable state constitutional provisions. 40 Because of the potential placement of liability for noise complaints
on local governments, some states acted affirmatively to control exposure to
aircraft through land use control and building design. Minnesota, for
example, adopted an Airport Zoning Act, 4 1 establishing state and regional
airport neighborhood planning agencies. The agencies have responsibility
for promulgating regulations which will prohibit the development of incompatible land uses in areas near airports and encourage conversion of
land in noise-impacted areas to compatible uses. 42 Additionally, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting to maintain consistency
with the Griggs rationale, has avoided assuming responsibility for the taking of
local noise easements. 43 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in
its report to Congress in 1973, proposed that if a federal airport noise
certification procedure were implemented, it might shift liability from airport
44
owners to the federal government but many problems might result.
III. POST-Burbank PREEMPTION

CASE LAW

Although Burbank was narrowly written to apply to its specific factual
setting, several cases decided since Burbank have followed its rationale on
different facts. In Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown,45 the
38. Id. at 90.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Note, supra note 34, at 294. See also text accompanying notes 45-54 infra.
41. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 360.75-.91 (Supp. 1975). See Environmental Protection
Agency, supra note 3, § 2, at 50.
42. When inconsistent with other local zoning ordinances, the regulations promulga-

ted by these agencies have priority over the inconsistent ordinances.

Environmental

Protection Agency, supra note 3, § 2, at 50.
43. Note, supra note 34, at 294.

44. EPA REPORT To THE SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS,
REPORT ON AIRCRAFT-AiRPORT NOISE 112-13 (Comm. Print 1973).

93d Cong., 1st Sess.,

This
45. No. A-1139-73 (Super. Ct. N.J., App. Div., Filed August 14, 1975).
decision affirmed an unreported decision of November 8, 1973, cited in Russell,
Aircraft/Airport Noise: Current Legal Remedies and Future Alternatives, 42 INS.

CouNs. J. 92, 102 (1975).

The unreported case overruled an earlier decision in the
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court upheld a lower court ruling which had vacated an earlier court-created
curfew at Morristown General Aviation Airport. Though the plaintiffs
might have had an action for damages against the Morristown Airport
Commission on a theory of inverse condemnation, 46 the New Jersey Superior
Court, relying on Burbank, held that the local government was powerless to
issue the curfew because local regulation had been preempted by the federal
government. Local regulation, the court stated, could seriously interfere
47
with federal safety procedures.
County of Cook v. Priester48 involved a local attempt to protect the public
health, welfare, and safety by imposing restrictions not on noise levels but on
the weight of planes landing at the local airport. 49 The Priester court held
that the doctrine of federal preemption controlled even though the airport in
question, the Pal-Waukee Airport in Illinois, was privately owned but
publicly operated. Because Federal Aviation Administration personnel
operated the Pal-Waukee control tower, the court found that federal regulations controlled and that the 60,000 pound weight limit on aircraft was
unconstitutional as an invasion of the Federal Aviation Administration's
exclusive jurisdiction over airspace., 0 In this situation, the Priester court
stated, the county's use of its police power was invalid. 5 ' In another
Illinois case, Bensenville v. Chicago,52 the plaintiff sued for an injunction
prohibiting further expansion of O'Hare International Airport. Dismissing
the suit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
any state or local action in the field of aircraft noise and air pollution is
preempted by the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act of
1972. 53 The court stated, however, that the Bensenville plaintiffs still had
an action for inverse condemnation5 4 against the city as the airport operator.
case. Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J.S. 461, 261 A.2d 692
(Super. Ct. 1969).
46. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
47. Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, No. A-1139-73 (Super. Ct. N.J.,
App. Div., Filed August 14, 1975).
48. 13 Av. CAS. 17,544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
49. The county argued that it was defending public safety but did not state how the
safety of the public was impaired by heavier planes. It merely suggested that heavier
planes were more of a hazard to the community than lighter ones. Id.
50. Id. at 17,546.
51. Id. at 17,544.
52. 12 Av. CAS. 17,105 (7th Cir. 1971).
53. Id.
54. See notes 35-44 supra. The plaintiff's action for inverse condemnation would be
consistent with section 4911 of the Noise Control Act of 1972, which provides:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any noise control requirement or to seek any other relief ....
42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Supp. III, 1973).
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THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF NOISE REGULATION

A.

The FederalAviation Act

Federal authority to regulate aircraft noise derives from the Federal
Aviation Act 55 and the Noise Control Act of 1972.56 The Federal
Aviation Act states that the United States is "to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United
States . . . . 57 Prior to 1968, the FAA had exercised control over airport
noise under its authority to promulgate "regulations governing the flight of
aircraft . . . for the protection . . . of persons and property on the
ground." 58 In 1968, amid growing concern with the problem of aircraft
noise and its control, 59 the Federal Aviation Act was amended to include
specific authorization for the FAA Administrator to prescribe rules and
60
regulations for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom
and to include specific steps which must be followed by the FAA Administrator in prescribing noise abatement regulations. 6 ' The amended Act was
an attempt to provide some relief and protection to the public from unneces62
sary aircraft noise and sonic boom.
The 1972 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act, while continuing to
vest primary jurisdiction for the regulation of airport noise in the Administrator of the FAA, added mandatory input by the Administrator of the then
55. 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1970).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. 111, 1973).

57. 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970).
58. Id. § 1348(c).
59. See Note, supra note 15, at 234. This concern is demonstrated in the legislative
history of the 1968 Noise Abatement amendments. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2688 (1968).
60. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. III,
1973). The 1968 amendment was further amended in 1972 to read, in pertinent part:
mhe FAA, after consultation with the Department of Transportation and with
EPA, shall prescribe and amend the standards for the measurement of aircraft
noise and sonic boom . . . including the application of such standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of
any certificate authorized by this subchapter.
49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. I1, 1973).
61. 49 U.S.C. § 143 1(d) (Supp. m, 1973).
62. See Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 681. The Federal Aviation Administrator has
promulgated some regulations in the field of noise abatement pursuant to his authority
under the Federal Aviation Act. One such regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 91.87(g) (1975),
provides that if a pilot is assigned a noise-abatement runway by the air traffic controller,
he must use it unless he finds it unsafe. Another regulation, id. § 36.1-.201, prescribes noise standards for the issue of type certificates and for changes in certificates
for subsonic turbojet aircraft.
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newly formed EPA.6 3 The amendments provided that the EPA would
submit to the FAA such proposed regulations for control and abatement of
aircraft noise as the EPA considered necessary to protect the public health
and welfare. 64 The FAA was given the option of accepting, modifying, or
rejecting the EPA's proposals. However, in an attempt to make the EPA
opinions less easily discountable by the FAA, the 1972 amendments provide
that if EPA has reason to believe that the FAA's action with respect to a
regulation proposed by EPA does not protect the public health and welfare,
then the EPA may consult with the FAA and may request the FAA to review
its decision and report back to the EPA.65
B.

The Noise Control Act of 1972

The Noise Control Act of 1972 was the first comprehensive venture of the
federal government into the field of noise pollution control. 66 Under the
Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has major
responsibility for coordination of federal noise control programs in fields
other than airport noise.6 7 In the field of airport noise, however, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration retains the major
responsibility for promulgation of standards and regulations, and the EPA is
given an advisory role. 68
Congress, in enunciating the policy behind the new Act, noted that
excessive noise presented a growing danger to the country's health and
welfare, and that among the major sources of this undesirable noise were
transportation vehicles. 6 9 While stating that "primary responsibility for
control of noise rests with State and local governments," Congress emphasized that federal action was necessary "to deal with major noise sources in
commerce

. . .

which require national uniformity of treatment. '' 70

In the

63. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. I1, 1973). The EPA was established in 1970.
Reorg. Plan. No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, 84 Stat. 2086.

64. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1) (Supp.mI, 1973).
65. Id.§ 1431(c) (2).
66. See Note, supra note 1, at 284.
67. The EPA has chief responsibility for controlling noise of railroads, 42 U.S.C. §
4916 (Supp. I1, 1973), motor carriers, id. § 4917, products distributed in commerce, id.
§ 4905, as well as responsibility for identifying other sources of noise pollution, id.§
4904.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. III, 1973).
69. Id. § 4901(a) (1)-(a) (2). Indeed, the legislative history of the Act indicates that
both the Senate and the House were most concerned with the problem of protecting
public health and welfare in the vicinity of airports from the impact of noise from
aircraft and aircraft operations. See 118 CONG. Rac. 37,317 (1972).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4901(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1973).
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field of airport noise abatement, however, it merely ordered that the
Administrator of the EPA,
after consultation with appropriate Federal, State and local agencies
and interested persons, shall conduct a study of the (1) adequacy
of Federal Aviation Administration flight and operational noise
controls; (2) adequacy of noise emission standards on new and existing aircraft, together with recommendations on the retrofitting
and phaseout of existing aircraft; (3) implications of identifying
and achieving levels of cumulative noise exposure around airports;
and (4) additional measures available to airport operators and lo71
cal governments to control aircraft noise.
The Senate version of the bill had given the EPA responsibility for proposing
noise emission standards for aircraft. But in a compromise with the House,
whose bill vested sole authority for the regulation of aircraft-related noise
problems in the FAA, 72 the Senate provision for EPA control over aircraft
noise was dropped.
C.

Problems with CurrentFederal Regulation

In continuing the dominance of the FAA in the promulgation of aircraft
noise standards, the Noise Control Act of 1972 gave congressional approval
to what has been described critically ,as "at best an undistinguished record of
delay and apathy toward those who are daily subjected to potentially lethal
aircraft noise emissions.' 73 Such criticism of the FAA is not new. Opponents of the FAA argued during congressional debates that the agency had
not met its responsibilities under the Federal Aviation Act.' 4 Local gov71. Id. § 4906. See Russell, supra note 45, at 98-99, for the view that under the
Noise Control Act, the EPA may be unable "to exercise anything more than moral
persuasion upon the FAA ....
72. See 118 CoNG. REC. 37,088 (1972).
73. Note, supra note 1, at 301. See also Russell, supra note 45. In testimony before
the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, January 20, 1976, Representative Abner J. Mikva stated that the ". . . dilatory,
obstructionist tactics [of the FAA with regard to regulating aircraft noise] demonstrate
that the Federal Aviation Administration has clearly failed to deal with aircraft noise."
(Testimony on file at the Catholic University Law Review.)
74. 118 CONG. REC. 6037 (1972) (remarks of Representative Joseph Addabbo).
Senator Edmund Muskie pointed to the record of the FAA, and pronounced it "wholly
inadequate." 118 CONG. REc. 35,390 (1972). Senator Muskie further charged that the
FAA had yielded to aircraft industry pressure in the past by dropping noise standards it
had already promulgated. Id.
Senator Muskie's remarks echoed remarks of Representative John Wydler in the
House. While not denigrating the FAA's competence to regulate aircraft noise, Representative Wydler questioned its desire to do so. He pointed out that in the three and
one-half years since the passage of the 1968 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act,
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ernment officials, also unhappy with the existing program of FAA regulation, urged that power to regulate aircraft noise control be given to the
EPA. 75 Seeking more effective control of airport noise, local officials
felt that since they couid not expect relief from the FAA, they might be
satisfied with an EPA-administered federal program. 76 One California
official stated that "[t]he stumbling block to progress has been the FAA. They
have consistently denied responsibility for noise in airport environments but
will not allow local controls."' 77 The EPA, on the other hand, was viewed as
a new and "crusading" agency whose primary commitment was to protect
78
environmental well-being.
The wishes of critics of the FAA in local governments were not complied
with, however, and the airport and aircraft noise problem remains under the
jurisdiction of the FAA. As a result, localities which might be content to
allow the federal government to have exclusive control of the field if more
the FAA had shown "a complete and utter lack of willingness to use the authority which
we [gave] them to set the limits on jet noise which they should be setting." Id. at 6042.
Academic observers have also criticized the FAA as being more a captive than a
regulator of the airline industry. It has been said that the FAA "serves only the interest
of one segment of the public-the industry it was set up to regulate." Berger, Nobody
Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L REv. 631, 724 (1970).

75. The National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors have
stated that the EPA should be the "lead Federal agency for aircraft noise abatement
efforts." Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 3, at Appendix B.
76. According to one local official, "were meaningful Federal regulations adopted and
implemented to protect residents living within proximity to various jetports, local
government units would find it unnecessary to attempt local regulation." Letter from
Ralph G. Caso, Presiding Supervisor, Town of Hempstead, New York, April 4, 1968,
cited in Berger, supra note 74, at 706.
77. Letter from Randall L. Hurlburt, Environmental Standards Supervisor, Inglewood,
Calif., to Senator Edmund Muskie, March 24, 1972, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 35,395
(1972).
78. Louisville, Kentucky's Neighborhood Organizations in Support of the Environment (N.O.I.S.E.) has gone on record requesting reassignment of authority and responsibility for controlling aircraft noise. According to them,
based on . . . local experience, the Federal Aviation Administration is not enforcing existing legislation now on the books to protect environments surrounding airports. There is no reason to believe that the FAA's primary emphasispromotion of air commerce and the protection of safety-will change.
Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 3, at Appendix B. N.O.I.S.E. therefore
urged that the EPA be given authority to establish standards for controlling aircraft
noise, with the FAA acting solely as an enforcing agency. Id.
As the EPA explained in a draft report on noise pollution,

"'...

control of unwanted

sound is not a high priority issue for virtually any Federal agency or department. Only
when an agency's primary mission .... "'is the control of noise is action taken in the
field. "'For the FAA, aircraft noise is only an annoying interference in the basic goal
of the Agency: the most efficient, safest, and swiftest air travel possible.'" 118 CONG.
REC. 35,390 (1972) (remarks of Senator Muskie, quoting draft of EPA report).
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effective regulation could be instituted under EPA administration continue
to look for ways to assert a right to enforce local ordinances for airport noise
79
control in the face of alleged FAA ineffectiveness.
The EPA, in its 1973 report to Congress, found that the criticism which
had been levelled at FAA regulation of airport noise was justified. s0 "Based
on this Agency's studies," the report stated, "it appears that existing FAA
flight and operational controls do not adequately protect the public health
and welfare from aircraft noise.""" The EPA report went on to recommend
that a comprehensive national program be administered by the federal government.8 2 Because flight safety was of paramount importance in developing various noise controls, however, the EPA concluded that it was
the responsibility of the FAA, and not the EPA, to decide which specific
flight and operational controls would be adopted. Therefore, the EPA
3
reasoned, the FAA should have primary authority in the new program.
At the same time, however, the EPA report indicated that while the
federal government should have primary power to regulate airport noise,
"effective application of such powers and authorities, as are available outside
the Federal Government, is a necessary component of a comprehensive
aircraft noise control program."'8 4 The EPA report advised that in developing new airports, local governments could use their powers of "land
use planning, zoning, building code and building permit authority" to
significantly affect the noise impact of the airport operations. 85 Local
powers, however, were more limited in dealing with noise at existing airports.
According to the EPA, local governments had to continue to follow the
expensive route of applying eminent domain powers to compensate landowners for any taking they did to convert noise-impacted residential areas to
more appropriate uses, such as open spaces or industrial or commercial
areas.8 6 Under some conditions, and depending on interpretation by the
courts, airport proprietors could use other powers to place conditions on the
use of airport property, such as restrictions on the type of aircraft permitted,
the number of operations allowed per day, hours of operation, noise limits,
or a schedule of landing fees based on noise levels generated.87 The report
79. See notes 89 & 127 infra; notes 45-54 supra.
80. EPA REPORT, supra note 44, at 14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 108, 112.
83. Id. at 15-16. The EPA did, however, suggest some controls that it believed
merited consideration by the FAA. Id. at 17-45, 77-86.
84. Id. at 105.
85. Id. at 101.
86. ld. at 103-04.
87. Id. at 113.
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emphasized, however, that the local proprietors would probably be denied
these powers if they resulted in a "substantial burden on interstate commerce." 88 A definition of "substantial burden" was not given.
V.

PosT-Burbank ATTEMPTS

TO INTRODUCE OR APPROVE

LOCAL CONTROL OF NOISE REGULATION

Despite the blow given by Burbank to municipalities in their attempts to
control aircraft noise by means of local police power, proponents of local
input in the regulation of airport noise have not given up their efforts to find
official sanction for the right of local airport proprietors to enforce airport
noise regulations. Their efforts received a boost in February 1975, when
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, in
Air Transport Association v. Crotti,8 9 found that California regulations
designed to achieve a gradual reduction of noise levels at airports operating

under California permits were "not per se invalid as delving into and
regulating a field of aircraft operation engaged in direct flight, which is preempted unto the federal government under the Constitution and the laws of
the United States.""0 The California noise control regulations regulated
both cumulative noise levels for certain affected areas around airport facilities

and noise directly generated by aircraft in flight."'
The suit was brought by the Air Transport Association, an association
comprised of virtually all intrastate, interstate, and foreign scheduled air
carriers. The Association contended that the sections of the California
Public Utilities Code 92 and the corresponding regulations 93 regarding aircraft noise were invalid and unenforceable by virtue of the supremacy 94 and
commerce" clauses of the federal Constitution, and under controlling
88. Id.
89. 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).

90. Id. at 65.
91. See id. at 63.
92. CAL. PUB. UTL. CODE §§ 21669-69.4 (West Supp. 1976).
93. 4 CALIF. ADMIN. CODE ch. 6 §§ 5000-80.5 (1975). These are referred to as
California Noise Standards, adopted November 25, 1970. The cumulative regulations
prescribed an absolute limit of 65 decibels on the level of cumulative noise which could
be generated from the operation of an airport. It gave airports responsibility for
monitoring noise levels to insure that the noise level limit was maintained.
The
regulations provided that no incompatible land use (including residential use) could exist
in areas having a decibel level over 65. Several regulatory methods that airport
authorities could use were suggested, but not required, and airport authorities were left
free to devise and employ other methods. The direct flight prohibitions applied to
inseparable features of noise generated by aircraft directly engaged in flight.
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
95. Id. art. I, § 8. The Burbank case was decided solely on the basis of federal
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federal legislation. 96 The court found the airlines' reliance on Burbank to be
misplaced. 97 It strictly limited the Burbank holding to a situation involving a
municipality as a nonproprietor. 98 As support for its view, the court pointed
to the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act. This history, it stated,
showed that Congress had not intended to interfere with "basic airport
control." 99 The court also looked to federal regulations regarding noise
standards for aircraft type and airworthiness certification. 100 These regulations state that no determination had been made by the FAA that the noise
levels it suggested were or should be taken as appropriate or required for use
at, into, or out of any airport. Because no California airport had yet taken
any affirmative step which might conflict with federal regulation of interstate
commerce, the court held that it could not find the cumulative noise
regulations invalid on preemption grounds.' 0' A consideration of whether

those regulations in fact were unreasonable, arbitrary, or an abuse of local
police power had to wait until such facts arose directly to present the issue
before the court. 10 2 The California regulations governing noise levels which
occurred when aircraft were in direct flight, however, were declared to be an
invasion of the exclusive federal control over aircraft flight and operations,
airspace management, and utilization in interstate and foreign com-

merce. 10 8 Thus, while granting a partial summary judgment holding invalid
preemption under the supremacy clause by both the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court. The district court, however, had decided that the Burbank ordinance also
violated the commerce clause. It arrived at its decision by considering the impact of the
adoption of flight curfews such as Burbank's on a national level. City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 914, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
96. 389 F. Supp. at 60. The statutes bearing on the issue were the Federal Aviation
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970), and the Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§
4901-18 (Supp. II, 1972).
97. 389 F. Supp. at 63.
98. "[W]e take as gospel," the court stated, "the words in footnote 14 in Burbank:
'We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor'."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
99. Id. at 64. See S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968).
100. 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1975). The court took these regulations to mean that
responsibility for determining permissible noise levels for aircraft using a specific airport
remains with the proprietor of that airport. 389 F. Supp. at 64. The court distinguished
passive functions of local authorities from definite affirmative action. The measures
taken to date under the cumulative noise regulations, the court stated, had only been
passive (monitoring noise levels at or near airports) or "patently within the local police
power" (employment of shielding and ground level facility configurations, and development of compatible land uses). id. at 64-65.
101. 389 F. Supp. at 65.

102. Id.
103. Id.
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the direct flight regulations, the court declined to hold that the cumulative
04
noise regulations were invalid on grounds of federal preemption.1
The Crotti court's view that Burbank had not established that local airport
proprietors were preempted from regulating airport and aircraft noise has
been shared by others. In April 1975, Representative Abner Mikva introduced a bill in the United States House of Representatives which would
establish a system for the local control of airport noise problems. 10 5 The
bill, if enacted, will be called the Airport Noise Control Act of 1975. Currently under consideration by the Aviation Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, the bill proposes "that
communities most directly affected by airport operations and noise should
have, within limits, the ability and power to control those aspects of the
operation of airports which have a substantial negative impact on their
environment .

...,106

The bill explains that localities will be able to use

their power to control noise only as long as that exercise of control can be
structured so as to insure the safety and commercial viability of airport
facilities. 10' 7 Those local authorities to be granted power to control airport
noise' 08 would have the power to propose and, after a comment period, to
promulgate rules governing aircraft and airport operation procedures.' 0 9
Communities with high levels of aircraft noise would not exercise their
powers to control airport noise through municipal governments, but would set
up Noise Impact Boards, which would also have the authority to approve or
104. The EPA has recommended that the California Cumulative Noise Exposure
Level (CNEL) regulations be adopted as a federal (FAA) regulation, applicable in
California only, until a nationwide Federal airport noise regulation goes into effect.

See Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 3, at 6-8.
105. H.R. 6112, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
106. Id. § 2(a)(2).
107. Id. § 2(b). Under the bill, each local airport authority would complete a Noise

Exposure Forecast Study (NEF study). Id. § 3(a). On the basis of these studies, the
areas with the highest noise exposure forecast values (values of 30 decibels or higher)
would submit their studies to the EPA, FAA, CAB, and to their state environmental
protection agencies for further study and possible modification. Id. Upon completion
of this procedure, the areas with high NEF values would set up Community Airport

Noise Impact Boards to regulate the airport under their particular jurisdictions.

Id. § 4.

108. See id. § 4.

109. Id. § 5. This power would include the issuing of restrictions on the following:
(1) the times during which takeoffs and landings may be made;
(2)takeoff and landing procedures including approach, ascent, and power
use;

(3)jet and propeller engine use not necessary to flight;
(4)allocation of runway use; and
(5)designation of types and numbers of aircraft permitted to use the airport,
with or without conditions.
id. § 5(a).
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reject in advance any expansion of airport facilities within their jurisdictions."10
The bill contains a provision which permits concerned citizens to challenge
regulations promulgated by the Noise Impact Boards."' Upon such a
challenge, the Federal Aviation Agency or the Civil Aeronautics Board
would be empowered to hold hearings. On a finding that a challenged
regulation
has a substantial adverse effect on the safety of air traffic or on
the commercial viability of the airport or of an air carrier or carriers, and is not justified by the beneficial effect of the rule . . .
2
upon the noise environment surrounding the airport,"
the agencies would be able to declare the challenged regulation invalid. In
addition, on a preliminary finding by the FAA or the Civil Aeronautics
Board that a local regulation would have an "imminent and substantial
adverse effect on the safety of air traffic," the agencies would have the
power to order the regulation suspended without a hearing."18
While final action has not yet been taken on this bill, it is indicative of the
thinking of several groups concerned about the continuing problem of airport
and aircraft noise. Frustrated by the FAA's inability to curb the problem,
these groups feel- that a more effective solution may lie in partial local
control.
VI.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Present practices do not provide an effective solution in an area which is
becoming a growing source of danger to the public health and welfare.
Several groups have suggested plans for alternative methods of airport noise
regulation which they hope will work better than the present system. These
suggestions run the gamut from systems of firmer federal control to plans for
14
far greater local control in promulgating noise regulations."
110. Id.
111.

H.R. 6112 § 6(a), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

112. Id. § 6(c).
113. Id. § 6(d). The agency's action must be reported in the Federal Register and
the decision must be served on the challenging party within 10 days. Id. § 6(c).
114. See text accompanying notes 115-32 infra for examples of federal, state, and
local plans for noise regulation.
Although it would be a costly procedure, there have been several recommendations
that the airline industry be required to use currently available technology to retrofit older
aircraft with new mechanical devices for decreasing noise. See EPA REPORT, supra note
44; Testimony of Representative Mikva, supra note 73. Others, however, believe that
the high cost of retrofit makes it an impractical procedure. Representative Dale Milford,
Chairman of the House Aviation and Transportation Subcommittee, has stated his
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In July 1975, the Federal Aviation Administration proposed a new federal
airport noise policy. 115 Because it did not believe noise policy should "be
the result or product of piece-meal judicial decisions," the agency stated that
it wanted to develop a comprehensive policy that would accommodate as
many interests and eliminate as many conflicts as possible between the
various interstate and local authorities. 1 6 The FAA identified four potential policy options it could adopt, together with the implications of each
for the various local and national authorities involved in the regulation of
airport noise. The first possibility was that all airport proprietors' actions
would remain unconstrained by the FAA as long as the airport proprietors
did not interfere with aircraft operating procedures and management and
control of navigable airspace that was clearly federal. Adoption of this
option, however, in the FAA's view, would result in numerous individual and
unrelated court actions. 117 The second possible policy was for the FAA to
constrain completely local airport proprietors and to develop a comprehensive federal regulatory program of noise abatement. The FAA, however,
thought that this would be an overreaction." 18 Yet another option would be
for local airport proprietors to establish initial noise abatement plans which
would then be reviewed and approved or rejected by the FAA. 119 Though
this procedure would create a degree of national uniformity, it would be quite
cumbersome and would require effective cooperation between the various
federal, state, and local jurisdictions. It might also place planning demands
on airport proprietors which would be beyond their means.
The final proposed option was a continuation of present policy, in which
the FAA would neither support nor oppose restrictions imposed by airport
proprietors unless the restrictions constituted an undue burden on interstate
commerce or an unjust discrimination or interference with airport operating
procedures.12 0 The fault of this option is that as an ad hoe approach,
belief that retrofit costs too much in relation to its benefits. Fitting older aircraft with
sound-absorbing material retrofit would cost about $1.5 million per aircraft. Aviation
Daily, Jan. 21, 1976, at 106.
115. 40 Fed. Reg.28844 (1975).
116. Id. To this end, the FAA asked for the views of all concerned parties.
117. Id. This system would have the additional drawback of causing more litigation
between the airport operator and local citizens as well as the airport operator and various
elements of the aviation industry. If all municipal proprietors believed they had a right
to regulate aircraft noise, many more noise regulations would be enacted, each of which,
in all probability, would be challenged in court.

118. Id.
119. This would, presumably, better reflect local needs for air transportation than a
national plan.
120. Id. This plan could also continue litigation between the airport operator and
local citizens and between the airport operator and the industry.
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allowing some local regulations but not others, it would not assure consistency. 121 The FAA has asked for all interested persons to submit com1 22
ments, after which it will decide which option to adopt.
The EPA has endorsed the third proposal of the FAA and will shortly
propose to that agency its own similar plan. 1 23 Under the EPA proposal,
individual airport operators would be responsible for devising noise abatement plans to supplement noise reductions from federal regulations. The
EPA proposal provides for the FAA to approve, modify, or reject each
airport's noise plan on the basis of federal criteria. Additionally, public
hearings would be required locally for each airport's plan. The EPA is now
124
testing this proposal in pilot programs at eight airports.
State and local authorities also have devised new plans for the regulation
of airport noise. The Maryland State Aviation Administration recently
adopted an Airport Noise Control Program 25 which, when implemented by
individual airport proprietors, will allow the proprietors to set operational
and other noise abatement procedures for their airports.126 The noise
program was mandated by Maryland's Environmental Noise Act of 1974.127
The Airport Noise Control Program requires airline operators to assess the
noise environment created by the operation of their airports, including
projection of future usage; to delineate the noise zone, if any, and identify
any impacted land use areas; and to develop a plan to reduce or eliminate
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Roger Strelow, EPA Assistant Administrator for Air and Waste Management,
announced that the plan would be proposed in early 1976. 37 NoIsE REG. RPTR. at A-7
(1975).
124. Id.
125. Maryland State Aviation Administration Reg. No. 11.03.14, Airport Noise
Control Program.
126. 30 NoisE REG. RPTR. A-18 to -19 (1975).
127. Environmental Noise Act of 1974 §§ 1-13 (codified in scattered sections of
articles la, 35, 41, 43, 662 and Natural Resources, MD. CODE ANN.). The Act
provides in part:
The [Maryland] Department [of Health and Mental Hygiene] shall prepare
and submit environmental noise standards to the noise council for comment not
later than January 1, 1975, and ...

adopt.

. .

standards ....

In establishing environmental noise standards, the Department shall take
into consideration scientific information concerning the volume, frequency,
duration and other characteristics of noise which may adversely affect public
health, safety, or general welfare. Such effects shall include temporary or permanent hearing loss, interference with sleep, speech communication, work or
other human activities, adverse physiological responses or psychological distress, adverse effects on animal life, devaluation or damage of property, and
unreasonable interference with enjoyment of life or property. ...
MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 828(a) (Supp. 1974).
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the impacted land use area. 128 The Administrator is aiding airport
proprietors with technical and financial assistance while they prepare their
plans. Neither the Environmental Noise Act of 1974 nor the Airport Noise
Control Program spells out specific methods proprietors may use to curb
noise levels.
One local airport proprietor which has very recently promulgated an anti29
noise regulation is the Los Angeles City Board of Airport Commissioners.
In November 1975, the Board passed a regulation which would require each
carrier at the terminal to reduce by 20 percent annually its operations which
do not meet federal noise standards. The Board's goal is to have all airport
operations meet the standards by 198 1.180 The regulation requires airlines
to institute their own noise abatement programs. These could include such
measures as reduction of operations, rescheduling of flights, increased use of
quieter aircraft, changes in flight procedures, and retrofitting of older jets.
The regulation went into effect in March 1976, although the Air Transport
Association filed suit to have the ordinance enjoined and declared unconsti31
tutional.'
It does seem clear, despite the suit, that the Commissioners, confronted
with liability for noise under the inverse condemnation theory and the need
to comply with California's antinoise law, had to find some way to
curb the noise at Los Angeles International Airport. If the courts uphold
their attempt to force the airlines to regulate themselves, they may have
discovered a solution to the preemption problem. In light of the increasing
acuteness of the airport noise pollution problem, numerous other state and

local authorities are trying to devise schemes for noise control that can defeat
preemption challenges.' 32 It is likely that in the following months, such
local plans will continue to multiply.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Aircraft and airport noise has become an annoyance and, indeed, a health
danger to communities located near airports. Recognizing this, the federal
128. Maryland State Aviation Administration Reg. No. 11.03.14, § .05-A.
129. Aviation Daily, Nov. 10, 1975, at 44.
130. Id. The regulation is City of Los Angeles Resolution No. 9459.
131. Air Transport Ass'n v. Moore, Civil No. 76-0263-ALS (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 23,
1976).
132. One such example is an action taken in San Diego, California. The Board
of Port Commissioners of the San Diego Unified Port District has adopted a noise
curfew prohibiting jet takeoffs between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., and jet landings between
12 p.m. and 6 a.m. The curfew is in effect at San Diego's Lindbergh Field.

Use Restriction Res. No. 75-226, Dec. 2, 1975.

San Diego
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government has made efforts through federal legislation and regulation to
curb the offending noise. Advocates of federal noise regulation contend
that considerations of safety and uniformity necessitate complete federal
control, be it under the FAA or some other federal agency. 1 33 They argue,
moreover, that by virtue of the supremacy clause and the commerce clause
of the Constitution, the federal government has preempted the field of
control of airport or aircraft noise. They interpret the decision in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. as an endorsement of total federal
preemption in this area.
A careful reading of Burbank, however, reveals that it has left unanswered
the question of how much authority local airport proprietors retain to
regulate noise pollution at their airports. A sizeable number of concerned
parties feel that these proprietors can and should have some input in the
total program of airport noise regulation. Though some areas of an airport's
operations, such as direct overflight of aircraft, are the exclusive domain of
the federal government, there are other areas which can be locally regulated
to reflect local concerns and needs without conflicting with matters under
federal jurisdiction. Consideration of both these views leads one to the
conclusion that what is needed to control airport noise is an effective federal
program, giving real power both to the FAA and the EPA to promulgate
regulations, together with a component of local regulation to reflect the needs
of the local resident populations. Whether the EPA will be given real power
and whether local jurisdictions will be successful in asserting some element of
control over the area are questions that remain to be answered.

Judith Maloff Katz
133. See Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 3, at Appendix B.

